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Abstract
Over the past decades, the geography of comparative welfare state research has transformed. Whereas scholars used to
focus on a limited number of advanced industrialised democracies, they now increasingly study developments in Europe’s
periphery, East Asia, and Latin America. So, does this mean that the welfare state has spread around the world? To answer
this question, we analyse different ways to measure welfare states and map their results. With the help of International
Labour Organization and International Monetary Fund data, we explore measurements based on social expenditures, so-
cial rights, and social security legislations and show that each of them faces serious limitations in a global analysis ofwelfare
states. For some measurements, we simply lack global data. For others, we risk misclassifying the extent and quality of
some social protection systems. Finally, we present a measurement that is grounded in the idea that the welfare state is
essentially about universalism. Relying on a conceptualisation of the welfare state as collective responsibility for the well-
being of the entire population, we use universal social security as a yardstick. We measure this conceptualization through
health and pension coverage and show that a growing number of countries have become welfare states by this definition.
Yet, it is possible that at least some of these cases offer only basic levels of protection, we caution.
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1. Introduction
Over the past decades, the “geography of comparative
welfare state research” (Hort, 2005) has transformed. In
previous decades, scholars used to focus only on “eigh-
teen to twenty rich capitalist countries” in the OECD area
(Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 713). Scholars assumed that
the very concept of the welfare state could “hardly be
stretched” (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 713) beyond these
countries. Nowadays, research increasingly takes into
account developments in Europe’s periphery, East Asia,
and Latin America (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Huber &
Stephens, 2012;Wood&Gough, 2006)—even if they still
tend to shy away from comparing old and new cases.
Collectively, these cases have been labelled “emerging”
welfare states (Huber & Niedzwiecki, 2015). So, does this
mean that the welfare state—which is widely perceived
as a “European invention” (Gough & Therborn, 2010)—
has spread around the world?
In this article, we aim to answer this question. This
is trickier than it might appear. The question “when is
a state a welfare state” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 18)
is rarely explicitly answered in principle, let alone mea-
sured in practice. Furthermore, the “dependent variable
problem” (Green-Pedersen, 2007) debate has shown
that the welfare state is very much a contested concept
that encapsulates diverse understandings. This naturally
leads to conflicting findings, particularly when it comes
to the issue of welfare state change.
In this article, we analyse different ways to concep-
tualise and measure welfare states and map their re-
sults. We explore how different understandings are re-
lated to different approaches to measure welfare states.
We show that these approaches, based on social expen-
ditures, social rights, and social security legislations, all
face serious limitations when applied in a global analy-
ses of welfare states. In some cases, we simply lack data
on a global level. In others, we risk misclassifying social
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protection systems. As an alternative, we present a dif-
ferent conceptualisation based on the principle of univer-
salism. Surveying various welfare state definitions, we ar-
gue that the hallmark of the welfare state is the assump-
tion of “collective responsibility for the well-being of the
entire population” (Kaufmann, 2013, p. 35).We interpret
universalism in a minimalist way as requiring universal
social security, i.e., the provision of social security to the
whole population. This, in turn, is measured through cov-
erage indicators which have long been employed in wel-
fare state research (Flora & Alber, 1981). This focus on
universal social security as a yardstick for welfare state-
ness resonates well with the recent global emphasis on
“leaving no one behind” in the Sustainable Development
Goals (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2017).
Our results showhowa growing number of countries,
including a number ofmiddle-income countries, have de-
fied fears of a “race to the bottom” triggered by glob-
alisation (Rudra, 2008) and universalised social security.
However, we caution that the increasing global attention
on universal coverage since the 2000s has facilitated the
creation of minimal welfare states. These states provide
universal coverage for key social risks, but provide protec-
tion only on a basic level. Thismeans that these states fol-
low a model of “residual universalism” (Leisering, 2019,
p. 358). In such systems, public benefits essentially cater
to the poor, while the better-off prefer private benefits.
As a result, these systems do not ameliorate but produce
new inequalities (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 25), which
makes their status as universal systems questionable. In
case such systems proliferate, using our measurement
to map welfare states around the world would become
questionable. Instead, more demanding concepts of uni-
versalism that take into account benefit levels, as well as
the design of the social security system (Leisering, 2019;
Martinez Franzoni & Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016), would
have to be employed.
For the analysis, the article mainly draws on data
from the ILO and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
ILO data obtained from the ILOSTAT database and from
flagship reports is used to analyse social security legisla-
tion, social rights, and social security coverage (ILO, 2010,
2017, 2019). IMF data from the Government Finance
Statistics (GFS) database is used to analyse social expen-
ditures (IMF, 2019). We complement this data with in-
formation from “Social Security Programs Throughout
the World,” which is gathered by the Social Security
Administration and the International Social Security
Association, and with country-specific sources (Social
Security Administration, 2019).
The article is structured as follows. We start with a
discussion of three different welfare state conceptualisa-
tions. In the third section, we explore global measure-
ments of welfare states based on these conceptualisa-
tions. In the fourth section, we present an alternative
conceptualisation of the welfare state based on univer-
sal social security. We develop an operationalisation and
measurement based on this conceptualisation to map
welfare states around the world. In the concluding sec-
tion, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the
different measurements and discuss the implications of
our findings.
2. Contrasting Conceptualisations of the Welfare State
2.1. The Welfare State as an Ensemble of Policies
One simple but also popular conceptualisation of the
welfare state understands it as a sum of all social policy.
For instance, Clasen and Siegel (2007, p. 6) conceptualise
thewelfare state as “allmechanismswhich provide social
protection against and redistribution of market mecha-
nisms and outcomes.” This approach is straightforward
and sees thewelfare state as an ensemble of policies. The
welfare state refers to “sectors of state activity” and is
“something that a state has” (Wincott, 2001, p. 413). This
conceptualisation is only weakly related to the spread of
the notion and the degree of universalism, as the specific
content of social policies is left undefined.
In terms of operationalisation and measurement,
this understanding of the welfare state corresponds to
the measurement of whether countries have adapted
certain social security programmes. In this tradition, re-
searchers simply checkwhether countries have statutory
programmes in key branches of social security. These
branches are: old age, work injury, unemployment, and
sickness (some add family allowances). A welfare state is
said to be consolidated when legislation in two (Hort &
Kuhnle, 2000; Pierson, 2004) or three (Hicks, 1999, p. 67)
of these branches exist. The ILO (2017) classifies social
security systems with a similar measurement. Here, ma-
ternity, disability, and survivors insurances are added to
the list and countries are classified as having systems
with a “comprehensive scope,” if programmes in all eight
branches exist (ILO, 2017).
This approach faces at least two problems. First, it
links the welfare state closely to an ILO model of social
security. This model focuses on state provision of cash
benefits for clearly delimitated social risks. These risks
are related to the normal life course in post-agrarian so-
cieties. “Social policy by othermeans” (Seelkopf& Starke,
2019), i.e., unconventional policy instruments that serve
as functional equivalents of conventional welfare state
policies, does not feature at all. Hence, countries with
elaborate, but unconventional social security systems
might not score high. Researchers argue that there is an
affinity between low state capacity, high informality, and
unconventional social policy (Seelkopf & Starke, 2019).
Therefore, they likely play a bigger role in the Global
South—although they are also found in the Global North.
To provide just one example, India’s Public Distribution
System, which provides subsidised food, has been de-
scribed as the “centerpiece of India’s social protection
system” (Bhattacharya, Falcao, & Puri, 2017).
Second, the approach assumes that having legisla-
tion is in itself meaningful. In a global analysis this makes
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limited sense. In the Global South, legislation is fre-
quently not properly implemented and its reach is lim-
ited. Yet, with this approach, states that provide social
security only on paper might still be perceived as wel-
fare states. For instance, Vietnam and Uzbekistan appear
to have legislations in all branches of social security, but
few would describe them as welfare states. Hence, in a
global analysis, focusing only on the presence of social
legislation is problematic.
2.2. The Welfare State as Welfare Effort
Arguably the most widely employed concept to measure
the welfare state is “welfare effort” (Wilensky, 1975).
This refers to the amount of expenditures that a state
devotes to social functions, such as health or pensions.
The most common operationalisation of welfare effort
is public social expenditure as a share of national in-
come, which was the leading indicator in the early era
of comparative research (Zöllner, 1963). In this tradi-
tion, countries that devote significant shares of their na-
tional income to social transfers are—albeit often only
implicitly—defined as welfare states (Rudra, 2008, p. 23).
Yet, in the literature there is no clear threshold in terms
of an amount of social expenditure beyond which coun-
tries would be classified as welfare states.
An alternative conceptualisation based on social ex-
penditure has been put forward by Therborn (1984,
pp. 31–35). His definition boils down to the idea that
welfare states are states that devote more than half of
all government expenditures to social policy. In this con-
ceptualisation, the welfare state refers to a “distinct on-
tology or form of the state” (Wincott, 2001, p. 413).
Underlying this conceptualisation is the belief that the
priorities of the state are reflected in its budget. A state
that spends most of its money on welfare policies is
therefore by definition a welfare state. While Therborn’s
(1984) definition is intriguing, it has not been widely em-
ployed by researchers. Furthermore, it has been criti-
cised for its counterintuitive empirical results (Castles,
2006; Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 20).
Social spending data is “easily available in published
sources” (Korpi, 1989, p. 310). Yet, it rarely reflects under-
lying welfare state conceptualisations. Wilensky (1975,
pp. 1–2), for instance, defined the “essence of the wel-
fare state” as “government-protected minimum stan-
dards of income, nutrition, health, housing, and educa-
tion, assured to every citizen as a political right.” He
justified focusing on welfare effort by stating that it
“comes closest to capturing the idea of the welfare state”
(Wilensky, 1975, pp. 1–2). The mismatch between con-
ceptualisation andmeasurement is obvious. It is impossi-
ble to understand whether “government-protected min-
imum standards” are “assured to every citizen as a po-
litical right” based on expenditure data (Wilensky, 1975,
pp. 1–2). Unsurprisingly, critics argued that “expendi-
ture levels have only indirect bearing on…the core of
the modern welfare state” (Korpi, 1989, p. 310) and that
they are “epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of
welfare states” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 19). Similarly,
spending levels are not directly related to universalism.
The amount of overall spending simply does not specify
whether the whole population benefits from the social
security systems.
In a global comparison of welfare effort, two further
issues have to be noted. First, expenditures are partly
determined by socio-demographic factors. For instance,
the proportion of the aged in a country is closely corre-
lated with social spending. The higher the proportion of
the elderly, the higher social expenditures are. Hence,
countries with a relatively young populationwould rarely
post high welfare effort even if they provide generous
social protection. Accordingly, the analysis would be po-
tentially biased against countries at early stages of the
demographic transition.While this issue could be tackled
through the control of socio-demographic factors, a sec-
ond problem is more difficult to overcome. Social spend-
ing datasets usually measure gross expenditures. Thus,
the way tax systems affect social spending is often disre-
garded (Adema & Fron, 2019), making it difficult to com-
pare countries.
2.3. The Welfare State as Social Rights of Citizenship
Building on T. H. Marshall’s notions of social rights and
social citizenship, some scholars developed measure-
ments that would better reflect their underlying welfare
state conceptualisation (Stephens, 2010). For them, the
welfare state was “a state-organized, institutionalised
system of social guarantees” (Esping-Andersen, 1994,
p. 714). They developed new indicators to capture the
“extent and quality of the social rights that constitute
social citizenship” (Korpi, 1989, p. 310). These indica-
tors were collected in the Social Citizenship Indicator
Programme (SCIP), a database that “focused on citizens’
rights and duties legislated in programmes to alleviate
economic needs characterising the human condition”
(Korpi & Palme, 2008, p. 2). The “reference point” for
these indicators was “a worker in manufacturing or the
metal industry,” who has been in continuous employ-
ment for the past years (Korpi & Palme, 2008, p. 4).
In the Marshallian conceptualisation of the welfare
state, universality played a key role. The very term social
citizenship entails a universalist dimension, in that it is as-
sumed that citizenship applies to all citizens of a country.
Furthermore, Marshall (1950, p. 47) speaks of a “univer-
sal right to real income.” Measurements based on this
approach contained universality as one dimension, cap-
turing it through coverage indicators (Esping-Andersen,
1990, p. 70; Korpi, 1989, p. 315). Yet, universality was not
conceived as a pre-condition of welfare states in these
social rights-based measurements.
Social rights data was popularised by Esping-
Andersen’s Decommodification Index (DI). He under-
stood social rights “in terms of their capacity for
‘de-commodification”’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 3).
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Therefore, the index aimed to capture the decommod-
ification of labour, “the degree to which individuals,
or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard
of living independently of market” (Esping-Andersen,
1990, p. 37). This was operationalised in three distinct
dimensions—access to benefits, income replacement,
and the range of entitlements—and measured for three
programmes—unemployment insurance, sick pay, and
old-age pensions. While the index was devised to mea-
sure decommodification—and also Scruggs’ Benefit
Generosity Index (BGI) that was modelled after the DI
(Scruggs & Allan, 2006)—it has been widely used as a
proxy for the welfare state.
Both social rights indexes have been computed for
classic welfare states. However, it remains unclear how
valid a global application of these indexes would be. The
concept of decommodification presupposes that a prior
commodification of labour has taken place. This means
that employmentmainly occurs in formal labourmarkets,
which is not necessarily the case in the Global South. In
many southern countries, large sections of the labour
force remain involved in subsistence agriculture. Thus,
wage labour exists alongside other means of livelihood
(Böger & Öktem, 2019; Rudra, 2008; Wood & Gough,
2006). Moreover, the indexes measure three social insur-
ance programmes as it was believed that these “form a
key part of modern welfare states and of what Thomas
H. Marshall termed social citizenship” (Korpi & Palme,
2008, p. 2). Other policy areas, such as healthcare, are
not captured (Bambra, 2005). This is curious, as Marshall
(1950) himself saw health as crucial for social citizen-
ship. Finally, due to the focus on cash benefits provided
primarily through certain social insurance programmes,
the indexes would likely overlook “functional equiva-
lents” (Bonoli, 2007) of conventional programmes. For
instance, in the realm of unemployment, severance pay
and employment-guarantee schemes are two functional
equivalents that would not be captured by social rights
indexes. Countries that employ these policies would thus
be underestimated by such indexes. There is reason to be-
lieve that such functional equivalents aremore prevalent
in the Global South. Comparative research reports an “in-
verse relation between income level of a country and sev-
erance pay generosity” (Holzmann, Pouget, Vodopivec,
& Weber, 2011, p. 21). Employment-guarantee schemes,
which link public works with cash benefits, are found
in some crucial southern countries such as India and
Ethiopia (ILO, 2017). Perhaps this is one reasonwhy social
rights indexes have not been generated beyond a limited
number of countries in the Global North.
3. Mapping Welfare States around the World
3.1. Measuring Welfare States through Social Security
Legislation
Measuring welfare states through the existence of so-
cial security legislation is a simple but effective way to
grasp how thewelfare state has spread around theworld.
Today, “even the poorest Third World nation has some
form of social policy” (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 713).
Therefore, legislation can be expected to be a dimen-
sion that can be employed in a global analysis of welfare
states. The ILO provides in-depth data on whether statu-
tory legislation exists in eight branches of social security.
The higher the number of branches with legislation, the
more comprehensive a country’s social security system
is. Previous research has set two or three legislations in
the key four or five branches as a threshold for “welfare
state consolidation” (Hicks, 1999; Hort & Kuhnle, 2000;
Pierson, 2004).
Our results for 181 countries and territories (see
Supplementary File) show that social security legislation
has truly spread throughout the world. 148 countries
have legislation that provides cash benefits against more
than half of the eight social risks. The countries with
less comprehensive legislation are mainly found in sub-
Saharan Africa. Only a handful of countries do not have
at least two programmes in the classic four branches
(old age, unemployment, sickness, and work injury). By
the standards of previous research, most countries in
the world are consolidated welfare states, and 70 coun-
tries even have programmes in all eight branches, thus
being classified as “comprehensive” social security sys-
tems by the ILO (2017). Overall, the “world has seen so-
cial protection systems develop at an impressive pace”
(ILO, 2017, p. 4)—and this development continues at full
speed (Grünewald & Seelkopf, 2016). Still, the results
also suggest that simply measuring whether a statutory
nationwide programme exists is insufficient to differenti-
ate between welfare states and non-welfare states.
3.2. Measuring Welfare States through Public Social
Expenditure
On a global level, data on public social expenditure re-
mains surprisingly fragmentary. The most widely used
cross-national databases feature high income countries,
therefore excluding the majority of countries. The ILO’s
Cost of Social Security series, which had a global ap-
proach and served as the basis for pioneering compar-
ative studies (Wilensky, 1975; Zöllner, 1963), ceased to
be updated in the 1990s. While the ILO’s World Social
Protection Reports contain data on social expenditure,
they only compile data from other sources, such as
Eurostat, which puts doubt on the coherence of the data.
Currently, the IMF’s GFS is the best available data
for a global analysis of social expenditure. GFS contains
spending data based on classification of government
functions. To gauge welfare effort researchers have com-
bined social protection and health data. Yet, we also re-
port education and housing data, as these categories are
sometimes also perceived as part of the welfare state
(Therborn, 1984). GFS provides data for different levels
of government, such as central, local, or general govern-
ment. So far, research has focused on central govern-
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ment expenditures (Grünewald & Seelkopf, 2016, p. 120;
Rudra, 2008, p. 27). However, social policy is not always
the responsibility of the central government. In many
states, social policy is partly left to the local govern-
ment level. Hence, central government expenditures are
weakly correlated to general government expenditures.
To quote just one example, based on budgetary central
government data, China spent 0.25%on social protection
and health in 2016—the corresponding general govern-
ment figure is 10%. This shows that central government
data is not necessarily a good proxy for overall welfare
effort of a state. Therefore, we use general government
data for our analysis. Unfortunately, data for general gov-
ernment expenditures is limited to around 60 countries.
In order to broaden the reach of our analysis, we also
report results for countries with relatively high spend-
ing on lower levels of government. In this way, we are
able to include 74 countries and territories in the analysis.
Unfortunately, most of these countries are either OECD
or post-communist countries and thus the global reach
of the analysis remains limited.
The data (see Supplementary File) shows that most
countries post a relatively high welfare effort: 49 of 65
cases have social expenditures in excess of 10% of GDP.
Moreover, if we include housing and education, 57 of
74 countries spend more than half of their budget on
social expenditures. In that sense, they fulfil Therborn’s
(1984) definition of a welfare state. Denmark even de-
votes 73% of its budget to social policy. These high lev-
els of welfare effort are mainly due to the large number
of OECD, EU, and post-communist countries, which have
historically high social spending. For instance, average so-
cial spending is 21.9% in OECD countries, while it is only
10.3% in non-OECD countries. The lowest welfare effort
is observed inMyanmar,which spends only 2%ofGDPon
social protection and health. Among the countries from
the Global South, Mauritius, China, and Egypt stand out
with relatively high social spending and a high share of so-
cial spending. Additionally, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica, and the Marshall Islands, for which we have only
partial data, also post high social spending and likely to
devote more than half of their budget to social policy.
Despite limited data, we can thus conclude that at least
some countries in the Global South gradually approach
OECD standards of welfare effort.
3.3. Measuring Welfare States through Social Rights
Comparative researchers appear to have reached a
“silent agreement” that welfare states are best cap-
tured through social rights (Kühner, 2015), even if con-
cerns about “convergent validity” have been voiced
(Bolukbasi & Öktem, 2018; Wenzelburger, Zohlnhöfer, &
Wolf, 2013). Accordingly, social rights indexes have been
widely used as proxies for thewelfare state. The two pop-
ular social rights datasets, the SCIP and the Comparative
Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED), however, focus
on the Global North. Recent geographical expansions
notwithstanding, the datasets still include only around
30 (mostly European) countries. Due to the lack of data,
the leading social rights indexes, Esping-Andersen’s DI
(which is based on SCIP) and Scruggs’ BGI (which is based
on CWED), cannot be computed on a global level. Still,
themathematical structure of the indexesmakes it possi-
ble to estimate—with limited data—potential maximum
scores that countries can achieve. These scores should
not be seen as an assessment of the quality of the re-
spective social protection system, however. Rather, they
indicate the likelihood that the respective country has de-
veloped a social security system which is roughly com-
parable to those of classic welfare states. Moreover, the
scores give an indication of which countries certainly lack
such a social security system.
Although it is possible to compute potential maxi-
mum levels for both indexes, we focus here on the DI,
because it has a simpler structure than the BGI. The DI
is the sum of three sub-indexes for unemployment in-
surance, sick pay, and old-age pensions. For unemploy-
ment insurance and for sick pay, replacement rates, wait-
ing days, the qualification period, and benefit duration
are measured; for old-age pensions the minimum and
standard replacement rates, the share of employee con-
tributions in pension funding, and the qualification pe-
riod are measured. These indicators are standardised in
a peculiar manner. A country is assigned a score of 2 if it
posts a value within one standard deviation (SD) of the
indicator’s mean. It is assigned a score of 3 if it posts
a value greater than one SD above the mean. It is as-
signed a score of 1 if it posts a value lower than one
SD below the mean. Replacement rates are given dou-
ble weight as they are assumed to be more important.
To compute sub-index scores, the values for each indica-
tor are summed up and multiplied by the coverage level
of the programme.
The maximum score for the full DI is 48. This score is
achieved if coverage is universal in all programmes and all
scores for the remaining indicator are more than one SD
above themean. The DI scores crucially depend on cover-
age, as the sum of all indicators in a branch is multiplied
by coverage to signify the “probability that any given per-
son will possess the right” to benefit (Esping-Andersen,
1990, p. 49). With information on whether a country
has legislation in the respective branch of social secu-
rity and an estimate of programme coverage, one can
significantly narrow the range of values that the index
can take. Assuming that programmes exist in all three
branches, the maximum score is three times the mini-
mum score. For instance, assuming that legislation in all
three branches exists, a country with full coverage in all
three branches would range between 16 and 48. If leg-
islation only exists for old-age pensions, but not for un-
employment insurance and sick pay, as in many African
countries, a country could reach at best a score of 16.
Data on whether statutory programmes exist and
on pension coverage can be retrieved from the ILO.
However, for unemployment and sick pay coverage data
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 103–113 107
is not easily available. Looking at SCIP data (for theGlobal
North) for the number of people insured in different pro-
grammes, we find that the data for pensions, unemploy-
ment, and sickness do not vary randomly. Rather, in the
overwhelming number of cases, the number of people in-
sured for pension (active coverage) is either equal to or
exceeds the number of people insured against unemploy-
ment and sickness. In light of this fact, we can assume
that unemployment and sick pay coverage will rarely be
higher than pension coverage. In this sense, we can use
the pension coverage data to estimate the potential max-
imum level that unemployment and sick pay coverage
might take. To provide an example, ILO data indicates
that 41% of the labour force contributes to pensions in
Algeria (ILO, 2017). Yet, we do not know what share of
the labour force is insured against unemployment and
sickness. Now, to estimate potential maximum decom-
modification levels, we assume that unemployment and
sick pay coverage is, at best, 41%. Assuming that the re-
spective country achieves the highest possible scores on
the remaining indicators, we arrive at an estimate for
the potential maximum level that a country could score.
As explained above, this does not signify real DI scores.
Based on these considerations, we construct po-
tential DI scores for 165 countries and territories (see
Supplementary File). Unsurprisingly, nearly the whole
Global North posts high scores, with the United States
being the welfare laggard among the northern countries.
Interestingly, a number of post-communist countries,
such as Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Russia stand out as
having potentially high decommodification. Additionally,
China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong also post high values.
Within Latin America, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina
score well. In sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa has by far
the highest score. Whether these countries really pro-
vide high levels of social rights remains open, however.
If, for instance, replacement rates in these countries are
low, or unemployment and sick pay coverage are far be-
low pension coverage, DI scores would be markedly be-
low our estimates for potential decommodification.
Around 70 countries have low potential DI scores.
These countries are mostly from sub-Saharan Africa,
South and Southeast Asia. Moreover, some Middle
Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia or Oman, also
score low. Interestingly, two countries that have been
listed among the “most advanced welfare states in the
Global South” (Huber & Niedzwiecki, 2015, p. 796),
South Korea and Costa Rica, feature unimpressive scores.
Similarly, Mauritius, which has been applauded for its
universal social protection system (Sandbrook, Edelman,
Heller, & Teichman, 2007) is also not performing too well.
If real DI scores were to be computed for these coun-
tries, it is likely that they would be significantly below
our expectations. These examples point to the problem
that the DI is modelled after a certain type of social se-
curity system. This makes it arguably ill-suited to assess
countries where functional equivalents of conventional
welfare state policies prevail.
4. The Welfare State as Universal Social Security
In this section, we develop a simple measurement that is
devised to capture whether a country has become a wel-
fare state (Öktem, 2016). The measurement is grounded
in the assumption that a key characteristic of the welfare
state is universalism. Universalism is a crucial concept in
welfare state research, but one which is also very much
contested. Yet, there is “a reasonable degree of unanim-
ity” that at minimum, it requires that the entire popula-
tion must be included by social policy and have access to
benefits (Anttonen & Sipilä, 2012, p. 37). In other words:
There must be universal social security. This, we argue,
is the lowest common denominator of most of those
conceptualisations that perceive the welfare state to be
something a state is—and not what it does (Wincott,
2001, p. 413).
As we have seen, there are various welfare state con-
ceptualisations. However, most of them have a common
feature. They share the assumption that in order to qual-
ify as a welfare state, a country has to ensure universal
social protection of its population. Let us takeWilensky’s
(1975) definition as an example. In his view, the “essence
of the welfare state is government-protected minimum
standards assured to every citizen as a political right, not
as charity” (Wilensky, 1975, p. 1). Providing these “min-
imum standards” to every citizen essentially means en-
suring universal social protection. Taking this definition
seriously, a state has to guarantee these “minimum stan-
dards” to be a welfare state.
This emphasis on guaranteeing a ‘minimum’ is also
found in the British welfare state tradition (Veit-Wilson,
2000). Other approaches go beyond a minimum. Esping-
Andersen, for instance, focuses on adequacy. As we have
seen, universality is an important component of his DI be-
cause of the coverage indicators. He defines the welfare
state in more general terms as “a state-organised, insti-
tutionalised system of social guarantees that, uncondi-
tionally, assures adequate living standards to all citizens”
(Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 714). These “social guaran-
tees” are essentially rights-based social security policies
that, again, have to apply to “all citizens,” i.e., universal
social security.
An alternative way to conceptualise the welfare state
has concentrated on redistribution. The best-known ex-
ample is Briggs’ (1961, p. 228) definition that focuses on
howpoliticsmodifies “the play ofmarket forces.” Yet, key
components of Briggs’ (1961) definition are social secu-
rity (“narrowing the extent of insecurity”) and universal-
ism (“all citizens without distinction of status or class”).
Here, universal social security is a means by which the
state ensures redistribution.
Whereas these conceptualisations focus on spe-
cific outcomes, others remain more abstract. Kaufmann
(2013, p. 35), for instance, argues that “the specific dif-
ference that defines welfare state developments,” as op-
posed to social policy developments in general, is the as-
sumption of “collective responsibility for the well-being
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of the entire population mediated by political action.”
This “collective responsibility” has to be expressed not
just in “normative orientations” (Leisering, 2003), but
also in social policy. While in Kaufmann’s understanding
the precise policies would depend on the national con-
text, social security policies would, in any case, be part of
the policy mix. Given that the focus is on the inclusion of
the “entire population,” this approach thus also requires
universal social security.
These diverse understandings of the welfare state
all agree that a state has to ensure universal social se-
curity to be a welfare state. Hence, universalism, in its
“minimalist definition” (Martinez Franzoni & Sánchez-
Ancochea, 2016, pp. 28–30), can be described as a key
characteristic of welfare states—it is “the idea or princi-
ple that makes a state a welfare state” (Anttonen, Häikiö,
& Stefánsson, 2012, p. 191). It seems that whatever else
one expects from the welfare state—be it redistribution
(Briggs, 1961), institutionalisation of social protection
(Alber, 1989, p. 30), or full employment (Mishra, 1984,
p. xi)—one also expects that a welfare state assumes re-
sponsibility for the social protection of the entire popu-
lation. In light of this finding, I conceptualise the welfare
state as a state, whose citizens are all protected by the
formal social security system.
This conceptualisation excludes informal or tra-
ditional social security arrangements, i.e., family or
community-based social protection mechanisms. These
mechanisms, such as rotating savings and credit asso-
ciation, traditionally play an important role across the
Global South (Ahmad, 1991; Wood & Gough, 2006). Yet,
insofar as they are neither state-provided nor regulated
by the state, they should be seen as alternatives to the
welfare state. At the same time, the conceptualisation
does not determine throughwhich particular policies the
population is protected. This aspect is important for a
global analysis because it allows for the inclusion of un-
conventional welfare states that defy a policymodel. Still,
it concentrates on the social security system as the defin-
ing area of the welfare state. Furthermore, the defini-
tion does not assume state-provided welfare, but leaves
open the possibility that the state achieves universal so-
cial protection by means of regulation. In this sense, it
includes “regulatory” in addition to “provider” welfare
states (Leisering, 2011; Levi-Faur, 2014).
Although our approach sees universalismat the heart
of the welfare state, it is important to note that it does
not presuppose “programme universalism” (Leisering,
2019, p. 399). This term refers to the idea that in each
branch of social security, the population is covered by a
single programme and thus has access to similar services
and benefits. Instead, countries with “systemic univer-
salism,” which provide different programmes for differ-
ent parts of the population in each branch of social secu-
rity, are also included in this conceptualisation (Leisering,
2019, p. 405). Systemic universalism is found, for in-
stance, in continental European Bismarckian pension sys-
tems. In these countries, different occupational groups
have separate programmes, yet (nearly) the whole popu-
lation is covered. Hence, what matters is that collectively
programmes cover the whole population.
So, how can we capture whether states ensure uni-
versal social security, i.e., operationalise the definition?
Welfare state research has classically focused on four ar-
eas of social security that correspond to four social risks:
old age, sickness, unemployment, and work injury. Yet,
one can make a case for excluding the latter two in a
globalmeasurement ofwelfare states. Protection against
work injuries has not received much attention from com-
parative researchers. Even when included in measure-
ments of the welfare state, it was given less weight than
other branches of social security (Flora & Alber, 1981,
p. 54). Measuring protection against unemployment is
difficult due to the prevalence of functional equivalents
of unemployment insurance, which are hard to measure
consistently. Furthermore, as a social risk, unemploy-
ment appears to be less pressing in some societies than
in others. For instance, in communist countries the exis-
tence of a “right” and “obligation to work” meant that
policymakers did not see any need to introduce unem-
ployment insurance (Kaufmann, 2013). Old age and sick-
ness, on the other hand, could be more aptly described
as universal social risks. They are part of the human con-
dition and not simply the by-product of a particular eco-
nomic system. Moreover, they are by far the most impor-
tant branches of social security in terms of expenditure.
Therefore, we operationalise universal social security as
universal protection against old age and sickness.
Hence, we understand the welfare state as a state,
which ensures universal protection against old age and
sickness. We measure universal protection against sick-
ness through health coverage. Here, we mainly rely on
data from the ILO, which measures legal health coverage
through the number of “affiliated members of health in-
surance” in the case of insurance-based systems and the
number of people “having free access to health care ser-
vices provided by the State” in the case of national health
systems (ILO, 2017, p. 375). Admittedly, legal coverage is
not a perfect measure for understanding whether peo-
ple have effective access to health services. It only cap-
tures “entitlement universalism,” not “receipt universal-
ism” (Leisering, 2019). Yet, so far, we lack a better mea-
surement on the global level. For protection against old-
age, wemeasure “old-age effective coverage” (ILO, 2017,
p. 361). We rely on data from the ILO and other sources
that estimate the proportion of people above the legal
retirement age that receives old age pensions. This ap-
proach offers two advantages over the traditional way of
measuring pension coverage through the number of ac-
tive contributors (Flora & Alber, 1981). First, for various
reasons, in many countries legal entitlement is not suf-
ficient for claiming benefits. Second, in many countries
a sizeable share of the elderly receives non-contributory
pensions (Böger, 2013). In these countries, counting the
number of active contributors to a pension systemwould
underestimate coverage.
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For measuring whether countries are welfare states,
we combine health coverage and pension coverage with
a logical conjunction. Therefore, the universality of social
security is defined by the lower of the two scores. This
reflects the assumption that both health and pensions
are equally necessary components of the concept of so-
cial security. Health reflects the care dimension, whereas
pension reflects the cash dimension of social security.
A universal programme in one branch cannotmake up for
a lack of universality in the other. Social security is a pack-
age, which at its minimum contains protection against
the two most universal social risks, illness and old age.
For universal social security, people have to be covered
in both dimensions.
Our measurement of the welfare state as univer-
sal social security includes 160 countries and territo-
ries (see Supplementary File). Our results show that 39
cases have coverage levels of at least 90% and can thus
be reasonably described as welfare states. These coun-
tries also post high social expenditures, spending on
average 20.6% of their GDP on social protection and
health. Most of these countries are EU or OECD mem-
bers or post-communist countries. The exceptions are
Mauritius, South Africa, and China. Another 26 “proto-
welfare states” (Wood & Gough, 2006) cover at least
two thirds of the population. These include five Latin
American and a number of post-communist countries.
Furthermore, Greece and the United States are also in
this group. On average, these countries spend 14.2% of
their GDP on social policy.
From our data, 22 countries cover between one and
two thirds of the population. For these countries it re-
mains unclear whether they can be perceived as welfare
states. This is a heterogeneous group, with several cases
from the Middle East. 33 countries cover less than one
third, and another 40 countries cover less than 10%. By
our definition, these would be non-welfare states. This
group includes many cases from Africa and South Asia.
Furthermore, for another 28 countries we lack data in
one dimension. 13 of these cases score low on the re-
maining dimension, so they can also be described as non-
welfare states. Overall, the results reveal that the core
idea behind thewelfare state—universal social security—
has spread beyond Europe, albeit to a limited degree.
Interestingly, there is a decent correlation between uni-
versal social security and social spending (r= 0.61).
5. Conclusion
In this article, we explored whether the welfare state—a
European invention—has spread around the world. For
this purpose, we analysed three popular understandings
of the welfare state and their associated measurements.
These measurements based on social legislation, social
expenditures, and on social rights of citizenship revealed
shortcomings that make them ill-suited for a global ana-
lysis of welfare states. Mapping welfare states through
social security legislation is prone to overestimate social
security in countries where legislation is not effectively
implemented. At the same time, it is prone to miss out
on unconventional welfare states that rely on social pol-
icy by other means. Mapping welfare states through ex-
penditures is difficult on a global level due to data lim-
itations. Furthermore, welfare effort is linked not just
to the quality of social protection, but also to the socio-
demographic profile of the country, making global com-
parisons demanding. Mapping welfare states through so-
cial citizenship is also difficult due to data limitations.
Even if data were available on a global level, however,
the results would not necessarily be a good proxy for
the welfare state because of the close link to a particu-
lar policy model. Functional equivalents of conventional
policies would be overlooked.
As an alternative, we proposed to conceptualise
the welfare state through universalism, which we inter-
preted as universal social security. This is the lowest com-
mon denominator of influential welfare state definitions.
We operationalised this concept as universal protection
against old age and sickness and measured it through
health and pension coverage. This proved to be a sim-
ple but effective way to undertake a global analysis of
welfare states. It revealed that an increasing number of
countries have universalised social security, i.e., have be-
comewelfare states. This overall conclusion is supported
by the results of the threemore commonmeasurements
of the welfare state, even if the scores for single coun-
tries vary.
While fruitful, our approach also has shortcomings.
First, the measurement does not take into account social
policy by other means. However, given that it only cap-
tures two very basic branches of social security, the prob-
lem should be less severe than for some other measure-
ments, such as theDI. Second, since the 2000s, the global
social policy discourse focused on the fact that a mi-
nority received generous social protection while the ma-
jority remained excluded. In response, international or-
ganisations pushed for “extending social security to the
excluded” (Leisering, 2009). In some cases, this meant
universal coverage on a low level. In healthcare, some
countries such as China built virtually universal health
insurances, which cover only part of the treatment ex-
penses. In pensions, social pensions with benefit levels
too low to lift recipients out of poverty have spread
(Böger, 2013). Such systemsmay provide universal cover-
age, but they hardly offer social security. These systems
are good examples of “residual universalism” (Leisering,
2019). Although universal in terms of coverage, these sys-
tems essentially focus on the poor and offer low quality
benefits and services. As a result, such systems facilitate
the expansion of market-based options for the middle
classes. This, in turn, would lead to the rise of new in-
equalities between those who have to rely on public pro-
grammes and those covered by private services. While
“residual universalism” clearly constitutes an improve-
ment over having no social security, it does not really cor-
respond to a universalistic understanding of the welfare
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state. If more countries adopt such minimal but univer-
sal systems, ourmeasurement of thewelfare statewould
no longer work. In this case, one would need to select a
more demanding conceptualisation among the varieties
of universalism proposed in the literature. This could en-
tail taking into account benefit levels, benefit distribu-
tion, the institutional design of social policies, and the
overall architecture of social security systems (Anttonen
et al., 2012; Brady & Bostic, 2015, p. 274; Jacques &Noël,
2018, pp. 74–75; Korpi & Palme, 1998; Leisering, 2019,
pp. 357–369; Martinez Franzoni & Sánchez-Ancochea,
2016, pp. 5–8).
So, what implications does this global analysis have
for comparative welfare state research? Has the welfare
spread around the world? Partly, yes. A number of coun-
tries beyond the core cases can be understood as wel-
fare states. This is visible in legislation, spending, and
coverage. These cases could be compared to the clas-
sic welfare states to reveal new insights. In addition to
the post-communist countries—which already had com-
plex social security systems, relatively high social expen-
ditures, and fairly universal coverage before transition—
countries from the Southern Cone of Latin America, as
well as China, stand out. Hence, these countries could
be integrated into mainstream research. It would be in-
teresting, for instance, to generate social rights data to
explore in how far instruments devised to capture north-
ern welfare states also help us make sense of welfare
states in the Global South. Beyond these cases, it would
be alsoworthwhile to directly compare seemingly uncon-
ventional welfare states, such as Costa Rica and South
Africa, with classic welfare states.
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